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Chapter 1. Introduction
More and more expert systems (ESs) are being developed for business and 
accounting applications. ES applications range from those for accounting and 
auditing, to those for tax and finance, to those for operations m anagem ent and 
production. A survey of some of the auditing applications of expert systems is 
provided in O ’Leary and Watkins (1989).
For example, TRW now uses an expert system to verify that individuals 
attempting to access a credit reporting system are valid users. Recent newspaper 
articles have focused on the potential litigation associated with the unauthorized 
use of credit reporting systems; accordingly, the protection of such systems from 
intruders is critical.
Security Pacific has developed an expert system to assist in identifying the 
fraudulent use of debit cards with autom ated teller machines (ATMs). If it deter­
mines that fraud is likely, the expert system can block the use of the ATM system.
The first two systems are intrusion-detection systems, which are designed 
to determ ine if a user is an intruder. A nother type of expert system is used by 
Northwest Airlines to verify the pricing of the tickets that it issues. Using scan­
ning, the system verifies between 50,000 and 60,000 tickets each night.
As these examples suggest, expert systems can serve as sophisticated tools 
for protecting and effectively managing valuable corporate assets. But expert 
systems are not just tools; they are also corporate assets in themselves and, as 
such, are vulnerable to tam pering and increasingly require the consideration of 
the auditor. Accordingly, the purpose of this report is to  provide some guidance 
to those concerned with the internal audit and security of ES applications, 
both in accounting and non-accounting applications.
What Are 
Expert Systems?
Typically, expert systems are com puter programs that incorporate certain 
amounts of expertise or knowledge derived from hum an sources. These pro­
grams are used by a decision maker to assist in the decision-making process.
In some cases, the systems function independently o f a hum an user; however, 
such systems are rare.
Many systems are developed using expert system software referred to as 
an expert system shell. This software facilitates the developm ent of representations 
of the knowledge gathered from experts. For example, an ES shell could help 
a developer design rules according to which knowledge would be stored (for 
example, “If condition N, then consequence Q”). These rules sometimes include 
a weight representing the “strength of association” or probability of a statement. 
Shells also contain an inference engine that sorts through the knowledge in 
order to find the answers to user inquiries.
ESs sometimes also interface with data bases. W hen this is the case, the sys­
tems can derive data from data bases to assist in the development of answers to 
user inquiries. Alternatively, users may be responsible for providing the data.
The Scope of 
This Report
Accounting researchers and system developers have been working with artificial 
intelligence and expert systems for almost ten years. During that time, account­
ing and auditing expert systems have gone from the lab to the field. Now, expert 
systems are available to auditors and tax accountants alike. In addition, auditors
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are not only currently using expert systems in their audits, but are also facing 
expert systems that their company may be using in its operations. As a result, 
auditing such systems is an increasingly im portant consideration.
Unfortunately, both research on and experience with the auditing of 
expert systems are limited, which could have severe consequences. As noted by 
Moeller (1988, p. 8), “One would hope that we will no t have to wait for an 
‘Equity Funding’ type of event covering an expert system in order to have the 
impetus for sufficient audit guidance materials.” (Although Moeller’s article 
focuses on external audit considerations, his comments are of value to the inter­
nal auditor as well.) Thus, one purpose of this report is to investigate some of the 
prim ary concerns in the auditing of expert systems.
A nother issue critical to the initial and ongoing success of expert systems is 
security. If an ES is no t secure, it will be vulnerable to a loss of assets (possibly a 
loss in the particular application domain, for example, accounting, or a loss of 
knowledge to com petitors). Further, it will also be vulnerable to a loss of system 
credibility: The system could be changed, for example, and m ight not function 
appropriately. There are other reasons for ensuring the security of an expert 
system as well, some of which are discussed later in this report. Thus, the 
second purpose of this report is to investigate some of the issues relating to 
the security of expert systems.
The Structure of 
This Report
This report proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 has provided an introduction. 
Chapter 2 analyzes the unique aspects of expert systems and some of the impli­
cations for the auditing and security of expert systems.
Chapter 3 examines the auditing of expert systems. A summary of some 
of the previous research on auditing expert systems appears, followed by an 
extensive analysis of the types of systems that may need to be audited after 
the risk assessment of each system has been taken into consideration. The 
chapter concludes with a brief summary of some verification and validation 
approaches developed by com puter scientists that can be useful in the audit 
of expert systems.
Chapter 4 analyzes the security of expert systems. The prim ary focus in 
this chapter is on addressing the unique aspects of expert systems described 
in chapter 2 in the developm ent of a set of control considerations for 
expert systems.
Chapter 5 investigates the implications of additional issues on both the 
audit and security of expert systems. Chapter 6 provides a brief summary of 
this report.
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Chapter 2. Unique Aspects of Expert Systems
Expert systems are com puter programs and should be treated as such. However, a 
num ber of their characteristics differentiate expert systems from other com puter 
programs, creating new audit and security risks.
These unique characteristics include the developm ent environm ent (the 
policies, procedures, and approaches used to develop an expert system), the 
delivery environment, the m aintenance environm ent, the limitations of the soft­
ware, the technique of downward delegation, the source of data used by an 
expert system, the simultaneous incorporation of symbolic and num eric infor­
mation within an expert system, the explanation of the knowledge, the user 
interface of an expert system, the nature of the problem  structured in an expert 
system, and the notion that an expert system emulates hum an behavior.
Much of the uniqueness deriving from these characteristics relates to the 
knowledge in an expert system. Knowledge in an expert system is gathered from 
a variety of sources, including hum an experts, questionnaires, and books. In any 
case, that knowledge is likely to be a valuable asset o f the firm for which the 
expert system has been built. Therefore, it is necessary to establish appropriate 
controls to ensure that the knowledge is secure.
Some of these controls include those over the entry of knowledge into the 
system, the ability to access that knowledge for purposes of either changing it or 
controlling its “leakage,” the solicitation of inform ation that leads the system to 
use the wrong knowledge, and the use of knowledge to camouflage other knowl­
edge (for example, Trojan horse programs that have names and functions that 
conceal their actual purpose).
In addition, it is necessary to audit an expert system’s knowledge to ensure 
that it is correct and complete. Auditors have not been in a position to audit the 
quality of knowledge. As a result, new approaches need to be considered. These 
unique differences point to new audit concerns.
Since the auditing and security of traditional systems have been the 
subjects of many books and papers, this report will no t address these topics. How­
ever, this report is concerned with those factors that impact all com puter systems 
and have relatively unique implications for the security and auditing of an expert 
system. Four aspects of expert systems are identified in this regard:
1. The integration of expert systems with o ther systems.
2. The unique aspects of the audit and security teams.
3. The system developers (an outside vendor, an internal user, and so forth).
4. The users’ attitudes towards an expert system.
These aspects are discussed further in Chapter 5.
Development
Environment
In many cases, expert systems are developed by domain experts or users, not 
by a software engineer in the systems development department. For example, 
DuPont’s well-known approach is to support the development of a large num ber 
of expert systems by individual users. Since the systems development departm ent 
is not included in the process, it is not likely that an expert system will be devel­
oped with the same formality and structure of more traditional computer systems, 
nor is it likely that the development process or a system itself will be documented.
In addition, there is no generally accepted model of a life cycle or develop­
m ent methodology for expert systems. As a result, even if the development 
process was docum ented, there would be no one model with which the process
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Delivery
Environment
Maintenance
Environment
could be compared in order to determ ine its quality. Thus, it is often impossible 
for the auditor to satisfy himself or herself regarding the quality of a system based 
on the development process. Accordingly, there is little basis on which to audit 
the input or developm ent process. Due to the limitations of the development 
process, more emphasis is placed on the testing of the system to ensure its qual­
ity. Tests of system quality generally are referred to as validation and verification 
tests, and are discussed later in this report.
ESs are normally developed using a “middle ou t” approach, also referred 
to as a prototyping approach. Successive versions of a system are developed itera­
tively as the problem at hand becomes better understood. Indeed, the prototype 
assists in developing a better understanding so that another version of the system 
can be developed. This process allows the developer to gradually determ ine the 
knowledge that is necessary for the system to function properly. This approach 
contrasts with more traditional software engineering approaches such as the 
“top down” or “bottom  u p ” approaches.
Although prototyping has been found to be an excellent m ethod of elicit­
ing knowledge and gradually structuring a decision problem, it does introduce 
some security concerns. Researchers have found that prototyping makes manag­
ing and controlling the system developm ent process more difficult. If managing 
the process is m ore difficult, it may also be more difficult to m aintain security 
and easier for someone to sabotage the system.
W hen the user is the developer, the personal com puter (PC) typically serves 
as the development and delivery environment. Further, since PCs can be taken 
almost everywhere and are generally easy to use, many ESs that interface directly 
with users are developed for a PC environment.
Given the portability and relative ease of use of PC-based systems, it is 
difficult to control the extent of a system’s use. The ease with which PC software 
can be replicated and a PC can be accessed by other users is a primary concern. 
Systems can be developed and play an integral part in decision making without 
the internal auditors ever becoming aware of their existence. Even when the 
internal auditor is familiar with the development of a system, there is no guaran­
tee that the extent to which it may be duplicated or used by others can be 
controlled. Moreover, ESs created for PC environments are generally developed 
for PC operating systems, which have few security devices. In addition, access 
controls in PCs and workstations generally are severely lacking.
The m aintenance of the knowledge base of an expert system raises a num ber of 
audit-related questions, including the following:
■  Who can update the knowledge in the system?
■  How is the updating process accomplished?
■  Does the updating process jeopardize the quality of the knowledge?
The security of a system can be jeopardized if naive users are responsible 
for updating it. Although it is often suggested that knowledge can be freely 
entered and removed without disturbing the system, knowledge bases are fragile. 
The technical nature of the relationship between pieces of knowledge can be 
delicate and, without appropriate knowledge m aintenance, is easily disrupted 
by naive users.
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Software Limitations A portion of knowledge in expert systems (typically less than 10 percent) escapes 
standard representation schemes and requires special fixes. These special fixes can 
take any of a num ber of designs. For example, in order to accommodate non-rule- 
based knowledge representation in a rule-based expert system shell, an external 
program or module may be used. In addition, a linear programming module or 
statistical module may be used to supplement or interface with the system.
Special fixes pose an audit risk, since they may require additional audit 
tests that are not required for the rest of the system being audited. Further, the 
possible existence of special fixes is an audit concern, since auditors will not 
perform  additional tests if they have no knowledge of them.
Special fixes also pose a security risk because they offer the opportunity to 
hide knowledge that can result in unusual or dysfunctional behavior. Special fixes 
that involve additional modules, for example, offer the potential for intruders to 
hide Trojan horse programs.
Downward Delegation 
— Data-Base Access
By capturing expert knowledge in a com puter system, expert systems allow 
expertise to be leveraged. Thus, ESs can be used to “delegate” decision making 
downward. However, instances of downward delegation can lead to situations in 
which the ES needs access to data for which the user may not have appropriate 
clearance. That is, the ES may have a higher priority than the user. As a result, 
either authorized or unauthorized access to the ES can yield unauthorized access 
to the data base and result in security problems.
Sources of Data ESs solicit inform ation directly from the user, a data base, or both. Most tradi­
tional com puter programs function independently o f the user, soliciting 
substantial amounts of information from data bases. Data are massaged and 
num erous steps are taken to ensure that the inform ation is correct, depending 
on whether or not it is in a PC environment.
However, when data are solicited directly from the user, there is a sub­
stantial potential for error. Humans make errors of omission, misinterpretation, 
inconsistency, and other types of errors. If there is an error in the data input to 
the system, the ES may use the wrong knowledge, and it may develop inappropri­
ate recommendations.
Symbolic and 
Numeric Information
In general, expert systems are designed to process both symbolic and numeric 
information. Knowledge may be represented, for example, in a rule-based form at 
(“if condition a, then consequence b”), and the rules may include strengths-of- 
evidence or probability assessments.
Traditional com puter programs typically process num eric data contained 
in data bases. In the case of numeric data bases, software is available that allows 
the auditor to investigate relationships in the data. However, in the case of expert 
systems, there are no similar tools, other than the expert system shell, to assist in 
the examination of the knowledge. In addition, num eric data may generally be 
easier to audit than nonnum eric data because they are not necessarily affected by 
the nuances of language and the nature of symbolic meanings. Thus, it can be 
more difficult for the auditor to get to the inform ation in an expert system that 
needs to be audited. Since other types of com puter programs do not contain 
knowledge used as data by an expert system program, there has been no previous 
investigation of ways to secure that knowledge, the costs of not securing it, and a 
variety of other concerns.
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One im portant characteristic o f many expert systems that differentiates them 
from other com puter systems is their ability to explain their solutions and recom­
mendations. Such explanations range from a trace of the sequence of rules that
were used to come to the conclusions to specially developed explanation systems. 
These explanations reveal the insights of the experts from whom the knowledge 
was gathered.
Although insights into how a program  makes a decision may be im portant 
to a decision maker, such insights may be used against the system. In the case of a 
system designed to assist in stock purchases, buy and sell rules could be discov­
ered and used against the system. In the case of an audit system, insight into what 
transactions the system chooses to audit can be used against the system. Thus, the 
security of this area is another critical point in an ES.
User Interfaces Typically, ESs have user-friendly interfaces. These interfaces make ESs easy to use 
with both natural-language and menu-driver interfaces. This feature can facilitate 
the auditor’s ability to gather from the system inform ation about its behavior. 
Unfortunately, that ease of use is no t limited to authorized users, but also extends 
to unauthorized users. As a result, unauthorized users with only limited knowl­
edge may gain access to the system. This can be a major security problem.
Well-Structured Vs. 
Not- Yet-Structured 
Problems
Most traditional com puter programs are designed to solve well-structured 
problems that previously have often been structured as com puter programs 
or as manual processes. For example, accounting programs, such as those for 
the accounts payable and accounts receivable functions, are well-established 
com puter and manual applications.
O n the other hand, most expert systems are designed for decision prob­
lems that are not yet structured or difficult to structure. Previous approaches to 
a given problem  may include checklists or some other form  of docum entation 
or they may have no written structure. The lack of previous models can make the 
audit process a complicated one, since there may be no basis on which to assess 
system quality.
Users' Assumptions 
About Expert Systems' 
Emulation of 
Human Behavior
Since expert systems emulate hum an problem-solving behavior, the reaction of 
users to the em bodim ent of the expertise in a com puter program  may be a 
critical variable. For example, in the case of one expert system users began to 
assume that it would do all of the things that the hum ans it replaced would do. 
Unfortunately, the system was only designed to perform  certain functions, and 
the rem aining hum ans were expected to perform  other functions for which 
the system had not been designed. As a result, some functions were not done.
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Chapter 3. Auditing Expert Systems
The audit of expert systems has received only limited attention to date. This 
chapter summarizes some of that research. In addition, it provides a detailed 
analysis of the types of systems that may need to be audited. Finally, a brief 
discussion of the verification and validation of expert systems is provided.
The verification and validation of expert systems represent an active 
research area in com puter science and artificial intelligence. Its focus is on 
providing methodologies to assist in determ ining the correctness, completeness, 
and decision quality of expert systems. As such, it provides a major audit tool. 
Chapter 4 summarizes another audit activity: analyzing the security of expert 
systems. Because the discussion of security is so extensive, it has been placed in 
its own chapter.
Previous Research on There have been few direct references to auditing expert systems. However, at 
Auditing Expert Systems least four papers and one discussion from a book on electronic data processing
(EDP) auditing address issues on auditing expert systems.
Moeller (1988) relates the audit of expert systems with existing audit 
literature, and discusses the relationship of Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS) No. 3, The Effects of EDP on the Auditor’s Study and Evaluation of Internal 
Control (superseded by SAS No. 48 in July of 1984); SAS No. 48, The Effects 
of Computer Processing on the Examination of Financial Statements; and SAS No. 55, 
Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit to 
the internal control structure of expert systems. As part of his discussion, Moeller 
(1988, p. 7) notes that “while there is a growing body of other literature covering 
the auditor’s use of expert systems, there is very little published material on 
audit techniques for reviewing expert systems.” M oeller’s paper summarizes many 
techniques and points to a body of work on those techniques that has developed 
recently: the literature on verification and validation. M oeller’s perspective is 
that audits of expert systems should be aimed primarily at those systems in “finan­
cially significant applications.” Moeller took this approach in recognition of 
the external auditor’s role of attesting that financial statements are fairly stated.
Moeller’s report suggests that in order to m eet the unique requirem ents 
of expert systems, the audit of such systems could be accomplished using “con­
ventional application control procedures.” In particular, he provides a control 
analysis using input controls, processing controls, and output controls.
Kick (1989) discusses some of the risk exposures associated with expert 
systems resulting from a loss of strategic or competitive position, an inability to 
sustain growth, and a loss of strategic knowledge. The primary emphasis in his 
report is on ensuring that the auditor examine expert system applications to 
determ ine whether they are properly applied; are deployed to gain strategic 
advantage; are cost-effective; are well designed and operationally efficient; mini­
mize exposure to fraud, poor decision making, and other consequences; are 
used by individuals who are properly trained; are easy to maintain; and are 
continually updated. These issues have been referred to as effectiveness issues in 
the expert system literature.
In order to accommodate these concerns, Kick suggests audit procedures 
that consist of the following steps:
■  Examine selection priorities.
■  Review development standards.
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What Types of Systems 
Need to Be Audited?
■  Define roles and identify risks.
■  Review the knowledge engineering and validation process.
■  Evaluate efficiency and effectiveness.
■  Evaluate the m aintenance history.
Jamieson (1990) presents an analysis of the audit of expert systems in 
which he identifies a num ber of objectives:
■  Identify the personnel relevant to an audit investigation.
■  Identify the developer of the system.
■  Present an expert system development life cycle.
■  Review the evaluation of expert systems.
■  Understand the security, control, and auditability 
requirem ents appropriate for an expert system environment.
■  Review those mechanisms.
■  U nderstand where auditors should be involved in the 
developm ent process.
■  Review docum entation and legal concerns associated with 
expert system development.
Watne and Turney (1990) briefly analyze expert systems as a target of an 
audit. They suggest that systems that directly impact the balances in the financial 
statements or that provide inform ation to the auditor individually be the poten­
tial targets of audits. They also analyze some of the controls in expert systems 
using a structure based on general and application controls. Watne and Turney 
also note that the com puter science area of validation, discussed below, is the 
source of tests for the reliability and quality of the expert systems.
McKee (1991) investigates a theory of the dem and for audits of expert 
systems. His investigation provides a market-based analysis of the factors leading 
up to voluntary audits. These factors include:
■  The perception of conflict of interest.
■  The importance of the consequences of the use of the system.
■  The complexity of the system.
■  The remoteness of those who might perform  audits.
McKee’s report also suggests that AICPA Statements on Standards for 
Attestation Engagements (SSAE), Attestation Standards might play a critical 
role in the audit of expert systems, and although it applies to independent CPAs, 
it may also provide useful guidance to internal auditors. Attestation Standards 
indicates that an audit should be done by someone who has adequate technical 
knowledge and proficiency, in this case in expert systems verification and valida­
tion, and in the specific domain. In addition, Attestation Standards indicates that 
the assertion is capable of being evaluated against reasonable criteria that either 
have been established by a recognized body or are stated in the presentation of 
the assertion in a sufficiently clear and comprehensive m anner for a knowledge­
able reader to be able to understand them.
A critical issue in the internal audit of expert systems is the type of systems that 
may need to be audited. As is the case with traditional financial statement audits, 
those systems that impact the financial statements in a material m anner require 
an audit. However, since expert systems also emulate hum an decision making, 
they can have a far-reaching impact on the internal auditor and on the firm that
12
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uses them. This report identifies five basic types of systems that may need to be 
audited. (Of course, there may be other systems with which the internal auditor 
might also be concerned after having evaluated risk assessment.) The five basic 
systems are:
1. Systems that impact the financial statements
2. Systems that may impact the going-concern status of the firm
3. Systems that provide the auditor with inform ation that is relied 
on during an audit
4. Systems for which efficiency and effectiveness are of concern to 
the auditor
5. Systems that impact the security of o ther systems
Systems That 
Impact the
Financial Statements
In some cases, the auditor will find that an expert system impacts the financial 
statements directly. This impact can be observed in at least two ways. First, system 
activity may directly impact a particular account, such as loans. (For example, an 
expert system may be designed to assist in the loan-granting process.) Second, 
the system may perform  the tasks of a hum an accountant, such as allocating costs 
and revenues to different accounts.
In the first case, a system designed to assist in the choice of those to 
whom banks lend can directly impact the quality of the loans. There are many 
other situations in which a system can impact the financial statements. For 
example, authorizing credit card transactions or insurance reimbursements 
(two well-established applications) can also impact the financial statements.
One aspect of these applications is the expert system’s ability to provide 
an authorization for a set of transactions. This is typical of those transactions in 
which an activity has been delegated downward. W hen this is the case, expertise 
is captured and used by lower level personnel. It is critical that the expert system 
be audited when downward delegation exists, because the lower level personnel 
would have neither the knowledge to recognize unusual activities program m ed 
into the system nor the authority to act on that knowledge to alter the system.
In the second case, the expert system may provide or manipulate account­
ing num bers in the same way that a hum an would. W hen this is the case, the 
program  could include knowledge that leads it to make some inappropriate 
allocations. For example, revenues could be allocated to different periods in 
order to ensure a smoothness of income, or expenses could be allocated to 
the wrong accounts.
In either of these cases, the materiality of the activity would be a concern. 
If the levels were immaterial and the potential for fraud minimal, further audit­
ing would not necessarily be cost-beneficial.
Systems That Can 
Impact the
Going-Concern Status 
of the Firm
Many expert systems that are developed will not directly impact the financial 
statements, but they should be audited nevertheless. These systems include 
those whose activity is critical to the particular firm to the extent that their failure 
could force a change in its going-concern status. Such a change in 
status is a definite concern for the auditor.
For example, in the case of Van de Kamps (Los Angeles Times,
September 12, 1990), a new com puter system so disrupted deliveries that the 
firm was reportedly forced into bankruptcy. Although Van de Kamps was a 
privately held firm and the system that was im plem ented was not necessarily 
an expert system, the case does demonstrate the far-reaching impact that 
a com puter system can have on going-concern status.
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It is im portant to note that SAS No. 59, The Auditor’s Consideration of an 
Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, does not contain any requirem ent 
that such systems be audited for financial statement audits. However, for internal 
audit purposes, as noted in the example, the audit of such systems may be critical 
to the continued existence o f the company.
Systems That Impact 
the Audit
If expert systems are used in the audit process, they should be audited them ­
selves. Otherwise, errors and biases may be introduced into the audit process 
through the use of the audit software.
System Efficiency 
and Effectiveness
Once an expert system has been developed and found to provide correct deci­
sions, attention may be focused on alternative concerns, such as its efficiency 
and effectiveness. System efficiency relates to measures such as how well a system 
runs in its specific hardware and software environment. For example, when 
expert systems were first developed, many were so slow that the users did not 
want to operate them. The software with which these systems were built was very 
cumbersome. Accordingly, some systems were thought to be relatively inefficient.
System effectiveness concerns a system’s ability not just to provide correct 
answers, but also to identify better answers. Effectiveness addresses the questions 
“Can the system be improved?” and “Does the system help users make better 
decisions?”
Systems That 
Impact the Security 
of Other Systems
Increasingly, expert systems are being used to provide security to other systems. 
These systems are used to prevent and detect intrusions into the systems that 
they protect. The extent of the control of security systems varies from advisory to 
independent operation. In one situation, a hum an uses output from an expert 
system to establish whether or not there was (or is) an intrusion. The system may 
not work fast enough, so that an in truder enters and exits the system being pro­
tected before any action can be taken. In another situation, the system operates 
on its own devices to determ ine whether or not someone is a potential or actual 
intruder. The system may lock out legitimate users. In either situation, the long- 
run  viability of the system being protected may be questioned.
In some situations, security expert systems may fall under the set of systems, 
the failure of which could affect an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. 
If the security system is ineffective at keeping out intruders, it could be exploited 
or shut down, possibly leading to a going-concern issue.
Additional Reasons to 
Audit an Expert System
There are a num ber of reasons to audit an expert system. These reasons include 
economic conditions, specific m arket determ inants, and other factors. From an 
economic perspective, audited inform ation is worth m ore than unaudited infor­
mation. Thus, one can expect to see an audit as a means of creating value in 
some circumstances.
Specific m arket determ inants include conflicts of interest, the importance 
of a system’s function, the complexity of a system, and insurance demands. A 
conflict of interest m ight occur when, for example, a system is to be sold for use 
in another firm. The purchasing firm might not believe all the claims of the sell­
ing firm because it perceives the other firm ’s vested interest in selling the system. 
In critically im portant situations, the life of an individual may depend on the
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proper functioning of an expert system. In such situations, greater confidence 
would be given to an audited system. In o ther situations, an expert system may 
be extremely complicated. In these situations, an expert audit of the system may 
be able to turn  up problems that normally would not have been found. Finally, 
an audit can provide a type of insurance, since the audit provides a basis for 
determ ining the accuracy of an expert system.
Techniques of 
Verification 
and Validation
The SSAE Attestation Standards states that an engagem ent can be perform ed only 
if (a) the assertion is capable of evaluation against reasonable criteria that either 
have been established by a recognized body or are stated in the presentation of 
the assertion in a sufficiently clear and comprehensive m anner for a knowledge­
able reader to be able to understand them, and (b) the assertion is capable of 
reasonably consistent estimation or m easurem ent using such criteria. Again, 
while Attestation Standards does not apply to internal auditors, it may provide 
useful guidance.
In addition, Attestation Standards does not state the specific procedures that 
the practitioner should use. Instead, it focuses on the objective, which is to accu­
mulate sufficient evidence to reduce attestation risk to a level that is, in the 
judgm ent of the auditor, appropriately low for the high level of assurance that 
may be im parted by the auditor’s report. However, procedures should be chosen 
in order to assess internal control risk and restrict detection risk, in combination, 
so as to limit attestation risk to an appropriately low level (see paragraph 39 of 
Attestation Standards). Generally, these procedures will be derived from tests of 
verification and validation. Verification has been defined in much of the com­
puter science literature as an examination of the completeness, correctness, 
redundancy, and consistency of software. This process as a whole has been called 
“building the system right.” Validation has been defined as a determ ination of the 
quality of the decisions made by a system, as com pared to specifications, hum an 
experts, or alternative criteria. The process of validation has been called “build­
ing the right system.” Accordingly, it is evident that verification and validation are 
also concerned with the criteria and the consistency of estimation. An extensive 
list of basic concerns and tests is developed in O ’Leary (1987).
This report briefly summarizes many of these techniques. However, the 
reader seeking more detailed information is referred to the references and to the 
extensive references in the papers given therein.
This discussion draws on the substantial research on verification and vali­
dation in the com puter science literature. However, no t all of the issues relating 
to verification and validation have been resolved. As a result, although some solu­
tions are presented, the reader will have to look to future research for alternative 
and additional solution procedures.
Verification1 The purpose of verification is to determ ine whether or not the knowledge repre­
sentation in an expert system is correct. Probably the most frequently used form 
of knowledge representation is the rule “if a then b, with certainty factor y ” If one 
assumes that the knowledge in an expert system is represented in the form of 
rules, some of the verification tests can be specified.
Tests have been developed that can be used to determ ine when rules are 
incorrect, incomplete, redundant, or inconsistent. The rules are incorrect if they 
employ circular reasoning, as in the following example: “if a, then b; if b, then c; 
if c, then a ." The rules are incomplete if there is a rule with no a or b. There is
1 N azareth  (1 9 8 9 ), N yguyen  e t  al. (1 9 8 7 ), O ’Leary an d  K an d elin  (1 9 8 8 ), an d  O ’Leary (1990a  an d  1990b ).
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redundancy if there are multiple versions of the same rule in the same knowl­
edge base. The rules are inconsistent if there are two rules such as the following: 
“if a, then b” and “if a, then c.” In the last case, the occurrence of a leads to b and 
c, yet it is unclear which should be used.
There are also potential problems with the representation of uncertainty 
factors in expert systems. It has been found that developers of expert systems 
have difficulty using some of the schemes that have been developed to weigh the 
importance of the systems’ rules. As a result, the weights often do no t m eet the 
appropriate underlying assumptions of probability theory.
Validation2 The function of validation is concerned with the quality of the decisions of the 
expert system. There are a num ber of approaches to assist the auditor in analyz­
ing the validity o f an expert system.
O ne of the most frequently used approaches is for the expert to directly 
inspect the knowledge. This approach could benefit from the developm ent of a 
system that facilitates examination of the knowledge in the same way that audit 
software assists auditors in the examination of a data base. Such a system could 
allow the user to get a listing of the rules, or to get a pictorial network representa­
tion of the rules to assist in understanding how different rules are connected to 
each other.
Another approach is to treat the expert system as a black box and to test 
it against hum an experts. In such a test, the only concern is to determ ine the 
similarity of the judgm ents generated by the system and by the hum an expert. 
Typically, another hum an is used for purposes of comparison to determ ine 
which judgm ent is preferred. An alternative to this approach is to investigate the 
expert system to understand why it made certain judgm ents. W hen this is done, 
the explanation process plays a critical part in the process, in that it allows the 
reasoning used by the system to be analyzed.
Unfortunately, all of these methods require substantial hum an involvement. 
As a result, there has been a movement to develop alternative methods that require 
less direct hum an involvement. For example, O ’Leary and Kandelin (1988) pre­
sent statistical methods based on the weights of the rules in the expert system.
Auditor Requirements The potential audit team associated with the audit o f an expert system must have 
a broad base of knowledge. The team must possess knowledge of the application 
domain; otherwise it may be unable to determ ine when knowledge is incorrect. 
In one situation discussed in the Wall Street Journal, an expert on dams was 
thought to have withheld knowledge. However, at the time of the construction 
of the expert system, the developers had only a textbook knowledge of the 
domain. Thus, they were unable to assess the contribution of the expert.
The team must include someone knowledgeable about the tools of verifi­
cation and validation in order to test the system. There is a broad literature of 
approaches deriving from artificial intelligence, com puter science, and opera­
tions research.
Finally, the team must include someone with an understanding of auditing 
approaches and the requirem ents of auditing, and not just of expert systems. In 
addition, as discussed in the next chapter, an understanding of security needs is 
also critical.
2 O ’Leary (1 9 8 7 ), O ’L eary an d  K an d elin  (1 9 8 8 ), an d  O ’L eary (1 9 9 1 ).
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Although the analysis of the security of expert systems is an audit issue, it is treated 
separately, since security involves such a large set of issues. As noted below there is 
little, if any, specific research in the area of expert system security. The discussion 
presented here draws on the unique aspects of expert systems, as compared to 
other types of com puter programs.
Previous Research 
on the Security of 
Expert Systems
There has been very limited research on the security of expert systems. In gen­
eral, the closest discussion has been aimed at general EDP systems. Since expert 
systems essentially are com puter programs, they require the same security 
measures as other com puter programs. Many of the security concerns relating 
to traditional com puter programs have been addressed in other sources (for 
example, Halper et al. [1985] and Weber [1988]) and, thus, are beyond the 
scope of this report. However, expert systems differ in num erous ways from other 
more traditional com puter programs. These differences require the investigation 
of additional security concerns. Accordingly, the approach here will be to elicit 
some of these unique features and then discuss some of the controls that could 
mitigate the risks.
Security Controls for 
Expert Systems
The unique features of expert systems have a direct impact on the security of 
those systems. Some controls can be used with all types of expert systems and 
all types of expert system software shells.
Development
Environment
The controls devised for the development methodology are those security 
measures designed to prevent and detect the entry of inappropriate or wrong 
knowledge into initial versions of an expert system. Although prototyping pro­
vides insights into the knowledge required for the problem-solving process, as 
noted earlier there may be problems managing the prototyping efforts. These 
m anagem ent problems may result in security problems.
In addition, as expert systems move out of the lab and into production 
other problems may occur. As the num ber and size of expert systems increase, 
controls such as the m aintenance of production schedules and quality assurance 
become critical to project management. Further, as an increasingly larger num ­
ber of people become involved in the development of expert systems, the 
possibility that security problems will arise increases. The larger the num ber of 
people involved, the m ore likely it will be that one of them  will attack the system.
In response to these concerns, some developers have recently suggested 
that a more traditional software engineering approach be used to develop expert 
systems. These m ethods are more structured and so may more effectively employ 
controls to mitigate some of these problems.
Delivery Environment The personal com puter environment, which impacts any PC application, has a 
num ber of security threats associated with it. Since so many ES applications run  
on PCs, controls for this environm ent are examined here. First, PC operating 
systems such as DOS have few security devices built into them. For example,
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there is no general capability such as that provided by a system using passwords. 
Thus, unless such controls are a part of the ES shell, PC systems may be exploited 
by unauthorized users. In some cases, ES shells allow developers to embed pass­
words. For example, Guru, which is designed for use in a DOS environment, 
provides the designer with the ability to use passwords.
Second, most PCs are out in the open and easily accessed. Although locks 
are available for PCs, they are seldom used. Further, in some cases the only way 
to control access to a PC is to lock it in an office. The accessibility of PCs, com­
bined with their easy-to-use interfaces, makes it easier to access knowledge.
Third, PCs are often brought out of the office to rem ote locations. The 
security of the expert system (and other systems) on a PC can be enhanced if the 
hard disk or diskettes are brought with the user whenever he or she leaves the PC.
Maintenance
Methodology
The security of the m aintenance of an expert system is accomplished, in part, 
using organizational controls. The primary organizational response that has been 
developed for expert systems is to designate an expert systems m anager (ESM). 
The ESM is responsible for the overall operation and m aintenance of a given 
ES. Conceptually, the ESM is similar to a data-base administrator. Designating 
an ESM allows for the assignment of responsibility, which is not the case with 
team-based approaches.
An im portant m aintenance approach built into some ES shells and specific 
systems is to use verification tests. Verification tests are controls on the quality of 
the knowledge entered into particular ESs. For example, verification tests may 
be designed to ensure that there is no circular reasoning (“if a, then b; if b, then 
c; if c, then a”) . As of this writing, the verification tests vary from shell to shell 
and from ES to ES.
In some large ESs it may be cost-beneficial to develop a specific system 
to assist in the updating and m aintenance process. For example, in the case of 
EXPERTAX, a special m aintenance system has been developed to assist in the 
process of updating the knowledge in that system.1
Software Limitations 
(Preventing and 
Detecting the Use of 
Knowledge to 
Camouflage 
Other Activities)
Programming software might not m eet the needs of an application, requiring 
special fixes and separate modules. If the software does not m eet the needs, one 
form of control is a statement to that effect in the docum entation. Another gen­
eral form of control is a requirem ent that such special fixes and the expected 
behavior of the systems be docum ented.
One approach to the prevention and detection of the inappropriate use 
of special fixes is to use so-called intrusion-detection systems.2 These systems are 
called intrusion-detection systems because they are designed to either detect or 
prevent intrusions. They employ behavior patterns to establish expectations, 
which are then com pared to actual behavior. Such systems consist of additional 
com puter programs designed to m onitor the use of expert systems for unusual 
activity, which may include unusual com puter program  activity (such as that 
which would occur with a Trojan horse program) or unusual user activity (such 
as the use of a system at an unusual time of day or for an unusual purpose).
1 Shatz e t  al. (1 9 8 7 ).
2 S ee , for ex a m p le , D en n in g  (1987) an d  T en o r  (1 9 8 8 ).
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Downward Delegation 
— Access to Data Files
Downward delegation may occur when an expert system has been developed 
using expertise that is gathered at a higher level in the organizational hierarchy 
than the one in which it is to be used. In such situations, the expert may have a 
higher priority or clearance level than the user for whom the system is designed. 
Thus, the ES and the user have different levels of data-base security.
One approach to this problem  is to employ a data base for each ES, 
ensuring that the ES data base does not include any inform ation to which its 
set of users should not have access. Controls can be established to ensure that 
users cannot derive data to which they do not have access.
However, doing so still does not eliminate the basic problems presented by 
having different priority levels. There appear to be few simple solutions to this 
problem. A more complicated approach is to develop a system that allows the ES 
to access data but does not allow the user to see that data. This approach fully 
accounts for the interm ediary nature of the user.
Source of the Data 
(Preventing and 
Detecting Use of the 
Wrong Knowledge)
In some systems, the ES solicits data from the user. If the data are incorrect, the 
wrong portion of the knowledge base will be searched. Thus, it is critical that an 
ES provide controls on the data it solicits. These controls can include traditional 
data-edit controls (for instance, numeric field tests). In addition, they can 
include some specific application-based reasonableness tests. Such tests could 
include analyses of relationships between submitted data items (for example, 
those of the type “pay rate times hours worked = total pay”) or analytical tests of 
reasonableness.
Symbolic and Numeric 
Information (Preventing 
and Detecting the 
Changing of Knowledge)
There are specific tests that can be used to prevent and detect changing either 
the rules themselves or the weights on the rules.
One preventive approach is to provide the user with only a run-time ver­
sion of the system (for example, a compiled version). W hen this is done, the user 
can operate the system but not change it. However, in some cases, the user may 
need or receive a version of the system that is not a run-time version, or he or she 
may have a copy of the software with which the system was developed. Wh en this 
is the case, providing a run-time version may not be feasible, so alternative 
approaches must be used. For example, if there are weights on the rules in an 
expert system, a scheme could be devised to capture information on the change 
of the weights. Each weight could be multiplied by the num ber of the rule, a 
prime number, or some other number. An unauthorized change of one or more 
weights would result in a change to the product, which could be used to detect 
any changes. Further, some controls could be num eric in nature — for example, 
the num ber of rules, the product of the num ber of words in a rule and the rule 
number, or some other num ber could provide a basis for detecting and control­
ling changes to the system.
O ther traditional approaches such as base-case testing could be used to 
detect the possibility o f a change. Unfortunately, unless the test data tested the 
portion of the knowledge that was changed, this approach may not work.
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Explanation of 
Knowledge (Preventing 
Leakage of Knowledge)
The elimination of unnecessary leakage of knowledge can be critical to the con­
tinued success o f an expert system, and perhaps to the continued success o f the 
company that uses it. Two different controls are found in some types of ES shells 
that prevent the unwanted leakage of knowledge.
First, some shells offer the user the opportunity to provide an explanation 
that does not reveal the actual rules used by the expert system. These shells pro­
vide control over what is shown to the user of the ES, thereby controlling what is 
known about the system by the user. This approach may also be used to make a 
system easier to understand, since explanations (rather than system knowledge) 
are presented to the user. Second, in those cases where the explanations do not 
reveal the actual system knowledge, a run-time version can be used to control 
access to the knowledge.
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Chapter 5. Additional Concerns Regarding
Both the Auditing and Security 
__________ of Expert Systems________________
So far, this report has focused primarily on the unique aspects of expert systems 
that affect auditing and security. However, expert systems are also com puter pro­
grams and, thus, raise some of the same concerns that other com puter programs 
do. This chapter examines some of these concerns that, although not unique to 
expert systems, have im portant implications for the audit and security of expert 
systems. In particular, this chapter is concerned with —
■  The integration of expert systems.
■  The nature of the auditor team.
■  The attitude towards expert systems.
■  The system developer.
Since there are a num ber of reasons to expect that expert systems are different 
from other com puter systems, the integration of expert systems with traditional 
com puter systems deserves additional consideration. Previous research has 
exhibited a diversity of views on the impact that integration has on both what is 
audited and when it requires auditing. One author has suggested that “a system 
that is em bedded in an accounts receivable application should be audited as 
a separate entity and no t merely as a com ponent of the accounts receivable 
system,” while another gives the following example:
... [the] American Express expert system works under or is part of a much larger 
overall credit authorization system, a conventionally programmed application. While 
audit attention has almost certainly been given to that overall authorization system, it 
would not necessarily be given to the Authoriser Assistant subsystem. The auditor 
would give consideration to that subsystem only if it controlled a material amount of 
the receivable balances.
Integration of 
Expert Systems
Integration Of Systems The classic expert system is a stand-alone system that is designed to solve a single 
and Work Processes problem or part of a problem. However, as they have evolved, expert systems
have begun to be integrated into o ther more traditional com puter systems. Thus, 
an im portant concern in the audit of an expert system is the extent to which the 
system is integrated with o ther systems or work processes. The integration of sys­
tems and processes is illustrated in the figure.
Stand-Alone
Problem
Integrated
Problem
Stand-Alone
System
Integrated
System
A B
C D
Integration of Systems and Processes
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Impact on Audit For systems of type A, an audit of the system can be decomposed from much of 
the rest of the firm for independent assessment. Systems in this category might 
include a loan-approval system, in which many of each system’s activities and 
users would be relatively independent of other activities and users.
However, for systems in categories B, C, and D, the expert system is part 
of a system, a process, or both. It interacts with other components of the system. 
Accordingly, the auditor would be concerned with the expert system as a compo­
nent that interacts with the rest of the system components or work processes and 
with the overall system.
Systems in category B are distinguished from those in category A by the 
extent to which they complete work on a given problem. If the system only pro­
vides a solution for a part of the problem, as is the case in category B, there are a 
num ber of other persons or processes with which it must interface. In addition, 
there are a num ber of o ther inputs and outputs required for the overall process.
Systems in categories C and D are more complicated, since they are inte­
grated with another system and possibly represent only a portion of the work 
process. The integration with another system requires that input, output, or both 
be exchanged between the systems in categories C and D and another system. 
The resulting interaction of multiple systems can complicate the audit of the 
expert system com ponent, since the systems would likely employ different tech­
nologies. The impact of integration can be complicated further by the nature 
and audit requirem ents of the o ther systems. For example, if the other system is 
an accounting data base from which the accounting financial statements are gen­
erated, perform ing an audit becomes even more critical.
In any case, the primary concern should be the audit of the system. This 
audit would include an audit of any expert system com ponent and an audit of the 
system as a whole. By saying that a component does not need an audit if it does not 
include a material level of activity, one suggests that no system will ever have suffi­
cient materiality to require an audit if the components are made small enough.
Impact on Security The degree to which an expert system is integrated with other systems is also 
critical to its security. If an expert system is em bedded in another system with sub­
stantial security controls, the expert system can also benefit from those controls. 
However, if an expert system is em bedded in a system with a lesser degree of 
security than would normally be accorded to the expert system, the expert 
system faces exposure, which would not normally be a concern.
However, even if an expert system is em bedded in a system that is in a very 
secure environment, the threats faced by the expert system may be different. For 
example, a primary threat to an expert system could be posed by a lack of control 
over access to its knowledge base. In such a situation, as it is in auditing, it is 
im portant to consider both the individual expert system and the overall system 
in which it is embedded.
Nature of the 
Auditing Team
Currently, there is a relatively small num ber of EDP auditors (auditors who 
specialize in the audit and security analysis of computer-based systems). This 
specialty has developed over time in response to the need for auditors who 
understand the complicated audit and system environments of EDP operations.
In a similar sense, there is a need for expertise in the audit and security of 
expert systems. The audit and security of expert systems require knowledge both 
of the domain in which the system is built and of expert systems technology.
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Need for
Domain Knowledge
Since an expert system captures domain knowledge, it is critical for an auditor to 
be able to understand that knowledge. If the auditor does not possess any knowl­
edge of the domain on which a system is based, it would be very difficult for him or 
her to assess the quality or correctness of the knowledge used by the expert system.
The im portance of gaining an understanding of an expert system’s 
dom ain became evident in the course of the developm ent of such systems. W hen 
an expert system is developed, the developers typically become “near-experts.” 
Substantial case evidence indicates that even when the developers are not near- 
experts at the beginning of the development process, they are by the end of the 
process. For example, to build a value-added-tax (VAT) expert system, knowledge 
engineers found it necessary to travel with the VAT auditors for over a year. It 
took that long for the developers to obtain a sufficient understanding of the 
dom ain to develop a system. (Today of course, educating developers to such a 
degree would probably be too costly.)
Need for a 
Knowledge of 
Expert Systems
While substantial com puter software has been developed to assist auditors in their 
analysis of data-base systems, no such software has been developed to assist in the 
analysis of knowledge bases. If an auditor does not know about the process of 
knowledge representation or about expert systems in general, it would be very 
difficult for him or her to assess the quality or correctness of the knowledge repre­
sentation in an expert system. In addition, it could be very difficult for an expert 
to investigate aspects of an expert system such as efficiency and effectiveness if the 
auditor is unfamiliar with the technology. A lack of familiarity with the technology 
can also limit the auditor’s understanding of potential security difficulties.
Source of
System Development
As is the case with other com puter systems, expert systems can be developed 
internally or they can be purchased from a vendor. The problems associated with 
user-developed expert systems include inadequate docum entation, a lack o f con­
cern for security, control or audit matters, poor programming, and insufficient 
testing and evaluation of knowledge bases. (Similar problems are associated with 
systems developed in o ther environments, including research labs.) Typically, 
problems like those listed above indicate to the auditor that further testing of the 
system at hand is required. However, there are additional concerns associated 
with user-developed systems, including determ ining the existence and extent of 
use of such systems.
Finding the Systems Systems developed by research labs or systems development departm ents (as well 
as systems purchased from outside vendors) often leave a clear trace of their exis­
tence and use. However, user-developed systems do not always leave such a trace. 
Although user-developed expert systems may be em bedded in decision processes 
in a PC environment, their presence in a PC environm ent does not automatically 
make their applications immaterial. As a result, the auditor should take steps to 
identify the existence of these systems. Obviously, an expert system can be 
audited (and its security needs can be assessed) only after it has been identified.
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Use of Expert Systems Given the ease with which PC programs can be copied and implem ented, audi­
tors should not be surprised to find that multiple copies of an expert system 
may be dispersed throughout the firm. When this is the case, the auditor’s con­
sideration of materiality should not be limited to the single copy of the software 
that he or she has identified. The possible existence of any additional copies 
should be investigated.
Attitudes Towards 
Expert Systems
As noted earlier, expert systems emulate hum an decision making. The very words 
expert system draw an analogy between a hum an and a com puter program. 
Accordingly, users of an expert system or those who interface with it may assume 
that the system is more than ju st a com puter program.
For instance, in the case of one expert system em bedded in a work process 
of other com puter programs and users, it wasn’t clear to the users what the com­
puter program  could and could not be expected to do. People who interfaced 
with the system assumed that since it was an expert system, it would perform  a set 
of activities as thoroughly and completely as a hum an would. However, the system 
was specialized to accomplish a subset of a hum an’s activities. The hum ans who 
interfaced with it were expected to do some of the activities that they assumed 
the system would do.
The attitude towards an expert system can impact its audit and security. 
Thus, compliance audit activity may be emphasized in the audit of an expert sys­
tem. The observation that a system can perform  its set of activities according to 
expectations does not guarantee that the overall set of expert system and hum an 
activities will be done according to plan.
The security of an expert system could also be jeopardized when users 
make assumptions about its security. For example, if a system has some intelli­
gence, users might assume that this capability extends to the system’s security. 
Such an assumption could easily be unfounded.
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This report has examined some of the issues in the audit and security of expert 
systems. Since expert systems are com puter programs, they face some of the same 
audit and security concerns as o ther com puter programs. However, expert sys­
tems have a num ber of unique characteristics, many of which were summarized 
in this report. These unique characteristics require that special consideration be 
given to the auditing and security of expert systems. In addition, they also form 
the basis for the generation o f some audit and control procedures.
One of the prim ary issues addressed in this report is identifying the sys­
tems that should be audited. At least five different types of systems have been 
identified: systems that impact the financial statements, systems that impact the 
going-concern status of the firm, systems that provide inform ation that the audi­
tor will rely on in an audit, systems for which efficiency and effectiveness are of 
concern to the auditor, and systems that impact the security of o ther systems.
Tools that assist in the audit process include those developed by com puter 
scientists and artificial intelligence researchers to verify and validate com puter 
programs. Verification and validation are designed to ensure that a system is 
“built right” and that the “right system is built.” Verification and validation pro­
vide the basis for a sequence of tests of the quality of the system.
Some features of expert systems that are also comm on to other com puter 
systems can assist in determ ining critical audit and security activities. In particu­
lar, the degree of an expert system’s integration with traditional systems, the 
nature of the audit team, the source of the expert system developm ent effort, 
and the users’ attitudes towards an expert system also impact im portant audit 
and security steps.
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